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Noam Chomsky and the Culture of Technology1
Introduction
Many people who feel genuine moral concern for the
world reach for a conspiracy theory to explain why and how
it is the United States can engage in foreign activity that
is hypocritical of American values and destructive of third
world people and of the planet.

I will consider this form

of explanation as given by Noam Chomsky.

I will ask

whether the conspiracy theory gives a true and accurate
account of the present political reality or not.

The texts

The Culture of Terrorism2 and The Chomsky Reader3 will be
used as the guides for this consideration.

Both are

written by Chomsky, who is without question a leading
proponent of this form of explanation.

The first part of

the paper is a largely sympathetic report on the conspiracy
theory as Chomsky gives it.

The second part presents a

review of the recent literature surrounding Chomsky1s
political work.

And the third section offers a criticism

of Chomsky's position in the light provided by the device
paradigm, which is a conceptual tool used in the philosophy
of technology.4
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I

Noam Chomsky begins a recent book, The Culture of
Terrorism, written in the wake of and in response to the
Iran-Contra affair, with the sweeping statement that
American foreign policy is not guided by universally
beneficial or even benign goals.

Instead, the policy is

guided by a "Fifth Freedom" and most references to such
things as democracy and liberty, made in reference to the
international agenda, are but empty gestures designed to
secure the status quo:
The central— and not very surprising— conclusion
that emerges from the documentary and historical
record is that the U.S. international and
security policy, rooted in the structure of power
in the domestic society, has as its primary goal
the preservation of what we might call the "Fifth
Freedom" understood crudely but with a fair
degree of accuracy as the freedom to rob, to
exploit and dominate, to undertake any course of
action to ensure that existing privilege is
protected and advanced. This guiding principle
was overlooked when Franklin Delano Roosevelt
announced the Four Freedoms that the U.S. and its
allies would uphold in the conflict with fascism:
freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom
from want and freedom from fear.5
This statement will surely jar many Americans who have
come to believe that America engages in only noble foreign
activity, for the idea that the American government can act
contrary to the ideals of open democracy and freedom does
not correlate with the portrayal of America as the keeper
of the free world.

Many Americans think that America can

fail in its objectives but only insofar as the means to

those ends are incompletely carried out, e.g., the American
failure to commit the resources necessary to win the
Vietnam war.

But for Chomsky, the noble causes for which

America believes it stands are but larger than life semi
truths used to maintain public ease with the present
course.
This is indeed a radical and, some would no doubt say,
blasphemous conception of the American government and its
relationship with the world and its own public.

Chomsky,

nonetheless, takes great pains to detail this
conspiratorial outlook.

Much of the Culture of Terrorism

is devoted to the articulation of how, when, and where the
United States government has said one thing to the people
at home and pursued nearly the opposite abroad.
Chomsky gives many examples of the tendency to say one
thing and yet do another.

An example which stands out is

the government's handling of the Arias plan.

This 1987

regional plan called for moves towards democracy on the
part of all Central American nations, the idea being that,
if the Central American states and Nicaragua, in
particular, were to act democratically, the U.S. would be
obliged to discontinue its support of the Contra army
operating on the Nicaraguan frontiers, and the Central
American nations would be bound to pursue peace.
Chomsky claims it was the intent of the Reagan
administration to "sabotage the Arias plan."6

But

Chomsky reveals the diplomatic maneuvering on the part
of the Reagan administration to substantiate his point.

He

shows how Philip Habib worked with the Duarte government of
El Salvador to halt the first proposed meeting of the
Central American nations, set for June 1987, and how the
Reagan administration created their own peace proposal and
presented it on August 5, only one day before the Central
American leaders were to meet again to discuss the Arias
proposal.

The Reagan plan called for unilateral

disarmament on the part of Nicaragua in return for an
American promise not to arm the Contras.

This is not the

kind of proposal one would expect an independent and
rational country to accept, and, in fact, the Central
American leaders brushed it aside in favor of their own
policy.

For Chomsky, and for many others, these attempts

to intercede in Central America demonstrate the Reagan
administration's true intention of subverting the peace
process in Latin America.

And these diplomatic activities

of subversion, though by no means the most atrocious acts
carried out by the United States, according to the book,
show how the American government carries out a hypocritical
foreign policy.

For the government has stated all along

that it seeks real democracy in Nicaragua.

Yet, when

democracy was about to be put into place, following the
Arias plan, the United States subverted it, because,
according to Chomsky, the U.S. ability to dominate in the

region would be iessened if the Central American nations
were to act, for the first time in this century,
independently of the United States.7
The honest question that readily comes to mind is
"Why?":

"Why is the domination of Central America of such

importance to the American government that it would be
willing to undermine the internationally applauded peace
initiative and introject its own proposal in such an openly
hypocritical fashion?"

Chomsky gives his answer by

pointing to the needs of the powers that be.

He takes the

conspiratorial view that American foreign policy is guided
by the wish to subdue for the purpose of easy gain.

This

subjugation of third world people stems from the need of
those in power to dominate and to maintain their authority
while the end product of easy gain, be it economic or
«

political, stems from the principle of greed.

But Chomsky

insists that this greed is not the greed of the American
people per se.

It is the greed of the wealthy elites who

control the capital and means of production in the American
technological society.8
These elites are the leaders of business and politics,
and they conspire, using the forces available to them, to
act against the intentions, aspirations, and moral values
of the American people.

The means used by these people

range from the covert activity of the C.I.A. and F.B.I. to
the subtle but ever-effective maintenance of the prevailing

ideology of power and greed in the schools, as is
evidenced, according to Chomsky, by the emphasis on
business education in the high schools and universities.9
Of course, Chomsky acknowledges that the United States
is not the Soviet Union; and, therefore, the means of
control must be very different from the blatant use of
force and deceit once found there.

For, if anything, there

are a number of important laws and judicial decisions
guaranteeing free speech and procedural justice in the
United States.

But these rights can be subverted, provided

that the right forms of propaganda are employed by the
elites.

Chomsky says:

To pursue programs that are conceived and applied
in these terms, the state must spin an elaborate
web of illusion and deceit, with the cooperation
of the ideological institutions that generally
serve its interests.10
One such method that the elites employ to implement
the structural culture of terrorism is to manipulate the
people by appealing through the mass-media to the deepseated emotions of patriotism, righteousness, anger, and
fear.

Chomsky argues that the elites use these emotions to

suppress any dissent that may arise, for these emotions
have the power to bring people together under one leader
and under one policy.

Chomsky would like his audience to

realize that this mass manipulation of public emotion is
occurring much of the time and at all levels of culture.

The favorite emotion employed in this service, he
maintains, is fear:
There is a classic method for obtaining the
acquiescence of the public to policies it
strongly opposes:
induce fear. If the populace
can be led to believe that their lives and
welfare are threatened by a terrible enemy, then
•they may accept programs to which they are
opposed as an unfortunate necessity.11
If Chomsky were to apply this to the recent
presidential elections, he might well say that the election
of George Bush was made possible by the appeal to the fear
of the American population over crime.

That is, Americans

voted for Bush (former director of the C.I.A.), because his
anti-crime posture served as a response to the elitecontrolled-media-generated fear over crime even though the
American people tended to agree with Dukakis on many issues
of importance to them.
Another favorite method employed by elites to quell
dissent Chomsky terms "damage control."12

This phenomenon

occurs when part of the conspiracy has been exposed, take
for instance the Iran-Contra part of the world-wide
conspiracy.

The objective for the elites is to keep the

people from realizing the full scope of the conspiracy.
The elites allow one figure to become a prominent
scapegoat.

The scapegoat takes the public's attention away

from the real issues and the more powerful elites as he or
she falls from public grace and view.

Ollie North, of

course, serves as the paradigmatic example of this

phenomenon.

And to Chomsky's credit, the Iran-Contra

Affair report indicates that this was at least considered
by the conspirators:
According to North, a 'fall guy' plan was
proposed by Casey in which North and, if
necessary, Poindexter, would take the
responsibility for the covert Contra support
operation and diversion.13
Chomsky refrains from saying that the mass media are
blatantly controlled by the elites.

Rather, he claims that

there is a prevailing ideology or an alliance of power
which supports the status quo through the institutional
structures of the mass media.

He does not spell this

ideology out, except to suggest it rests with such American
ideals as peace, prosperity, and freedom— so long as these
ideals are not taken too radically.

By too radical Chomsky

means that so long as the American people do not expect
these ideals to be applied across the board and with
equality, for, if they were radically applied, the rule of
the elites would be threatened— and the elites simply would
not allow this.

Chomsky assumes that Americans have a

sense of this prevailing ideology and, therefore, they know
what is safe and not safe to do in the country.

Thus, the

prevailing ideology of American values, taken as a smoke
screen for greed, becomes a structural entity.

And the

elites that control American institutions continue to act
behind this screen with little regard for American values.
Hence a young and bright journalist must decide whether or

not he or she will write the truth and be fired or continue
on with the safe course of middle-of-the-road journalism
and live a reasonably secure middle-class life.

The

prevailing ideology that permeates and oppresses modern
life will force this disquieting question by way of the
already corrupted editor, and it will typically ease the
journalist into the middle class.

This is Chomsky's

suggestion, but he declines to define the ideology.
Instead, he gives proof of its existence by pointing up its
concealed presence and its all-pervasive force to explain
the atrocities carried out by the U.S. government.15
Perhaps we can create a juncture by stopping to look a
little deeper at Chomsky's basic vision which surely is
emerging.

At the most basic level, the American people are

duped into supporting activity which is contrary to their
moral beliefs by clever and manipulative people whose only
intentions are to maintain their power and feed their
greed. These people are conscious of their roles, yet they
do not take seriously the moral aspirations of the American
populace.

In fact, by spurring the people into emotional

positions on difficult international questions and by
giving thoughtful people in middle-class jobs ideological
ultimatums the elites develop and reinforce a concealed but
recognizable culture of terrorism.

Yet, if we examine this

form of explanation we find a number of assumptions that
are given relatively little consideration in Chomsky's

work.

This neglect on Chomsky's part is of a piece with

the lack of clarification given the notion of the
prevailing ideology.

The assumptions are:

1) the

conspiracy really goes against the wishes of the American
people, 2) the elites have the power to organize themselves
and to institute a huge and largely invisible conspiracy 3)
there is a prevailing ideology that dampens whatever
resistance may hinder the elites' projects, and 4) if the
people were alerted to these covert activities they would
use their political liberties in mass and change the
government and its policies.

But before taking on these

assumptions it will be beneficial to summarize the
positions taken by recent reviewers and critics of Chomsky,
so as to place this essay in the current political
conversation.
II
Recent reviewers of Chomsky's political work have
focused their criticisms in three areas.

The first area of

criticism centers on the notion that Chomsky undervalues
the complexity of the international predicament, and,
therefore, the reviewers hold, his moral critique of the
U.S.'s use of terror fails in being too simple to account
for the facts.

The second type of criticism centers on

Chomsky's strident tone and his unwillingness to engage in
honest dialogue with the representatives of the status quo.
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The third area of criticism focuses on the question of
whether or not Chomsky's model of conspiracy misses the
center of responsibility for the atrocities and whether or
not his model presents a misleading vision of the
relationship between contemporary domestic politics and
American foreign policy.
Recent reviewers in The Economist16 and The Times
Literary Supplement17 give examples of the first critique.
The Economist, in a short, unsigned review, points out
Chomsky's notoriety, stemming from his work against the
Vietnam War.

The article likens him to a "curious insect,"

"preserved in amber."18

By these statements I presume the

authors mean that he remains singularly determined to voice
his moral grievances as he did during the Vietnam war, even
though his audience can no longer be rallied by one
dominant issue.

The article notes Chomsky's consistency by

noting his equal moral outrage over both the U.S. war on
Vietnam and the Soviet war on Afghanistan.

But, for the

reviewers, this type of consistency is only an "anarchist's
consistency."19

The Economist reviewers give him a further

"curious" stamp by questioning his moral vision, given the
complexity of the international questions.
asks rhetorically:

The article

"So no American intervention (in

Vietnam), no boat people?
•

Then why did millions migrate
*

from north to south Vietnam m

the 1950's?"

20

the question open, the answer is presupposed.

By leaving
Thus, by

their refutation of his credibility in terms of his factual
analysis, Chomsky is nudged toward the intellectual
periphery.

It ought to be noted that this type of

criticism fuels the outrage of Chomsky and his followers,
for The Economist’s criticism subtracts simple morality,
which normally places limits on social activity, from the
international political reality. Thus, the elites are left
the room to develop their own destructive policies which
serve only their power and greed.
Charles Townshend of The Times Literary Supplement
criticizes Chomsky on the same grounds.

Townshend notes

that Chomsky sees aggression as pivotal to any American
foreign policy decision, and that Chomsky "refuses to
accept that any such policy can have been conceived or
executed in anything but a spirit of unwavering hostility
to the people."

Chomsky argues that the destruction of

foreign people is a conscious goal of policy, but,
Townshend continues, "such a conclusion misses the
complexity that constitutes the problem."21
The second area of criticism which focuses on
Chomsky's tone is formulated by both Townshend and Brian
Morton of The Nation.22

Townshend terms Chomsky's form of

argument "exiguous" in that the arguments start from their
conclusions and fire one atrocity after another at the
reader until the reader is inoculated, convinced, and
outraged as well.

Townshend echoes other liberals when he
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states that Chomsky is so convinced "of the righteousness
of his perceptions that he is impervious to criticism,
[and] unreachable in discussion."23

This point no doubt

presents a problem, for public interchange is critical to a
functioning and well-intentioned democratic nation.24
Brian Morton who calls Chomsky "a national hero" for
his efforts during the Vietnam war notices the stridency of
Chomsky's tone as well.

In his article "Chomsky Then and

Now" Morton illustrates the changes that Chomsky underwent
during the 60's, 70's and 80's as reflected in his
writings.

In the 1960's, Morton shows, Chomsky sought

public debate and was working to participate in what John
Dewey calls the "give and take" of political exchange.25
But by the late 1970's, Morton writes, "The dominant
feeling of the . . . [work], as I read it, is anger."26
Perhaps this anger can be traced to the dispersion of
his audience due to the American withdrawal from Vietnam.
For as The Economist reads it Chomsky "retains his
conviction that if he shouts loud enough the crowd, which
must be out there somewhere, will materialise again."27
This possibility gains its credence from the fact that, if
only for a while, Americans were rallying against moral
atrocity, big business, and a lying, mischievous
government, and that during this period, Chomsky was a
forceful and articulate leading intellectual.
no more.

But this is

The crowd, once doused with water canons and tear
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gas, is now controlled by the "newspeak" of the modern
»

•

press and irresponsible liberal intellectuals.

28

These

forces, no doubt bearing blame, are now granted power of
oppression that surely must be preventing the mass from
forming again against the powers that be.
argument fails to convince the majority.

But Chomsky's
And his voice

becomes shrill and, sadly, isolated.
The third area of criticism, found in the recent
literature, is not as elaborately presented as the
preceding two.

Yet, it is mentioned in at least three

recent articles, including Morton's.29 Meril Rubin of the
Christian Science Monitor30 asks whether Chomsky's
allegations of thought control and oppressive conspiracy
really illuminate the issue and whether Chomsky, as Peter
Osborne of the New Statesman suggests, "over-generalize[s]
his critique of American political science?"31
These final questions, I believe, are the most Useful
questions to be asked of Chomsky, and, unfortunately,
although they are asked, none of the reviewers attempt to
answer them thoroughly.

They are, at any rate, the

theoretical questions that are the subject of the third
part of this essay.
Ill
With his vision briefly stated and the reviewers taken
into account, I can turn to an examination of the above

enumerated assumptions in the light provided by the device
paradigm.

But first it should be noted that Chomsky does

go to great length to call to our attention the nature of
American activity abroad and the types of contradictions
these activities create with our stated ideologies of
peace, democracy, and human rights.

Americans may have

vague notions that their government has done little to
rectify the situation in Central America.

Chomsky shows

very precisely how it is that America has blundered away
opportunities for progress and how the official policy has
promoted brutal dictatorships.

Nonetheless, by looking at

Chomsky's assumption from the insight which the device
paradigm gives of contemporary life, it will be found that
the conspiracy theory, which he uses to explain the
American government's atrocious foreign record, gives an
inaccurate account of what really guides American foreign
policy and of the American people's involvement in it.
The first assumption that the conspiracy goes against
the best intentions of the American people must be granted
to Chomsky right off.

For if the American people found the

activities that Chomsky calls to our attention acceptable,
there would be little reason to consider the conspiracy
question.

People could only wonder why a few elites were

trying to hide something from them which they thought was
quite all right to begin with.
brings more difficulties.

But assumption number two

When the enormous organizational problems that the
minority elites would have to tackle, if they indeed ran
the country, are considered, it seems the elites would need
a shared operating secret that would bond them in their
activities and that could not be revealed to the public.
The conspiracy secret, for example, could never be leaked
to the public due to feuding or other interelite conflicts
of whatever kind.

The secret bond would have to be kept

completely within elite circles.

Yet, this seems

impossible, for it is known that people come in and out of
money via luck and misfortune.

Yet, it is never heard said

that someone could not become an elite because he or she
could not partake of the elite's controlling secrets.

In

fact, if there are shared elite secrets, they seem to stand
under one publicly accepted heading:

the heading of

prosperity understood as affluence.
Of course, American collective experience with
Watergate and Iran-Contra gives the people good reason to
suspect that there is a conspiracy.

But the question here

becomes "What is the scope of the conspiracy?”
encompassing as Chomsky means to suggest?"

"Is it as

Both scandals

constitute conspiracies against the law and the best
intentions of the people, but in each case the conspiracy
was limited to a small, closely-knit band of government
officials and self-interested operatives.

In neither case

can one find evidence of the type of world-encompassing

17

conspiracy on the part of the elites that Chomsky would
like to suggest.

And in the case of the Reagan

administration conspirators, they seem too individualistic
to organize an impenetrable group.
Thus, with the huge organizational problems facing the
elites, the elites must have some other mechanism, besides
the powers they hold as elites, to institute their world
wide conspiracy.

Chomsky gives such a mechanism.

it the prevailing ideology.

He calls

And this is where the notion

of conspiracy gains it credibility, for the ideology is not
held by elites only, rather it becomes a structural entity.
We could call it the mix of wishy-washy bourgeois
liberalism and strident neo-conservativism which so
dominates the U.S. political landscape.

In any case, the

ideology is biased towards the status quo and it serves to
blind people to the truth of what is occurring, both at
home and abroad.

Chomsky speaks of this ideology as if it

were a framework for social life, leaving no room for
dissent that could possibly prevail upon the elites to
change their ways and the course of American foreign
policy.

It is my contention that the device paradigm, as a

conceptual tool, can spell out this ideology more
precisely.
The device paradigm tells us that modern life has a
twofold character guided by the promise of technology.32
This twofold character shares many essential qualities with

a technological device.

The technological device, such as

a personal printer, contains a hidden machinery that
produces an easily available commodity, that being printed
material.

As a citizen of the technological world, one

knows little about the machinery except that it secures the
product which one expects of it.

And this expectation is a

natural expectation in our day, for technology has brought
with it the great promise of disburdenment and prosperity.
In the particular case of the printer, people are
disburdened from having to write with pen and paper, and
they share in the prosperity of generally available printed
material.

On the large scale this twofold character of the

device and the promise of technology has shaped the reality
of the modern world as well.
The twofold character comes to determine the way
citizens of the advanced industrial countries live in work
and play.33

For they work in the machinery of the

technological society, be it in private business or the
public sphere, and in each area they work to secure widely
available, safe, and easy commodities.

The machinery

becomes invisible once the people are at home, for there
they have left their work lives behind.

And once they are

at home they are free to engage in the leisure activities
of their choice.

In keeping with the promise of technology

these activities are considered prosperous and are no doubt
disburdening.

Prosperity has come to mean the affluence surrounding
the ownership and consumption of freely available
commodities in the private sphere.

While, disburdenment

has come to signify freedom from engagement with those
parts of life which once gave the technological world's
device-counterparts their character.

For example, in the

case of shopping, people are now disburdened from
encountering snow in the town center (counterpart).

And

now they are free to shop in climate-controlled and muzaksaturated shopping malls (device).

In this freedom from

engagement and through affluent consumption, provided by
the technological machinery— which grows more concealed and
sophisticated by the day— we find the prevailing ideology.
The prevailing ideology is articulated in the pattern
of the technological device.

But it is not something

instituted by the elites, whoever they may be.

Rather, the

twofold character and the promise of technological life
have been accepted, bought into, and affirmed and
reaffirmed by the people of the United States and the other
industrialized nations.
has difficulty facing.

This is the sad fact that Chomsky
He recognizes that the character of

contemporary life is critical to the lack of change seen in
America in areas of moral concern.
with it directly.

But, he does not deal

He takes the easy path and gives the

responsibility for this life-style-ideology to the elites,
who surely implement it for their own financial gain:
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Part of this effort has been to create a certain
conception of 'the good life1 at home . . . a
conception that happens to conform to the needs
of the wealthy and privileged sectors that
dominate the economy as well as the political and
ideological systems.34
Chomsky is trying to say here that Americans would not
buy microwaves and televisions and motorhomes if it had not
been for the elites who manipulated them by creating a
conception of the good life.

It is possible that Americans

have been duped into a life of dubious quality by
advertisers and businessmen.

But it is not only these

elites who have done the duping:

moms and dads, and aunts

and uncles, and neighbors and competitors have all played
their role in the duping.
promise of technology.
things of whatever sort.

The fact is Americans accept the

Americans love the new-fangled
This acceptance, though changed

and refined with the times, has a definite character.
The fact that prosperity is central to the American
conception of the good life was affirmed by the recent
election of George Bush.

He asked Americans:

"Are you

better off today than you were eight years ago?"35
majority of Americans responded "Yes."

And the

And by responding

yes, Americans tacitly affirmed the technological culture
and its promise of prosperity and disburdenment.36

This

point contradicts the notion that Americans voted for Bush
because of elite-generated fear.

And it is a point that

should not be taken lightly, for, by voting with their

21

pocket books, Americans once again affirmed the rule of
technology as the prevailing ideology

of

modern life.

Where does this leave us in terms of American foreign
policy and the failure of the U.S. government to live up to
its ideals?

It points to the fact that because the

American government is charged with the responsibility of
maintaining the structure of society,

it

must maintainthe

characteristic divisions and benefits

of

the paradigm.And

since the paradigm itself has no intrinsic morality,37 there
are no immediate requirements for morality placed on those
who maintain the paradigm.

There are some moral

expectations placed on the leaders of government, but they
are very often a burden to social planning, rather than a
guide to planning.

Thus, Americans can back murderous

dictators like Pinochet in Chile and Marcos in the
Philippines until the people catch up with the moral
monstrosities these leaders commit and demand that their
government shun them on moral grounds.

But there can be no

doubt that the American government will not interfere with
dictatorships so long as they are stable and continue to
promote, through their economic activity, however small,
prosperity here in the U.S.38

This is a decidedly dark side

of the American love affair with prosperity and the culture
of technology.

And it points to the complicity of the

American people in these atrocious behaviors.

This is a difficult subject, because Chomsky's first
assumption that the acts of government go against the best
intentions of the people must be accepted.

Yet, the

acceptance of this assumption stands against the idea of
complicity only at the surface.

The American people are

not such amoral creatures that they openly sanction death
squads, torture, and C.I.A. proxy armies.

What Americans

do sanction is the culture of technology, which is
completely committed to prosperity in the U.S.

People, in

this commitment, continue in their disengaged leisure
activities such as shopping and watching t<v.
outside this realm tend to become fuzzed.

Most issues

This is

especially true in areas of foreign concern.

For these

concerns are furthest away from the immediate machinery/
commodity life-style.

And the debate that occurs is not

only distant, but complicated.

Surely, one cannot expect

someone busily watching "Wheel of Fortune" to drop Pat
Sajax and find impartial materials on Central America and
come to a decision.

Americans must do so, however, if

democracy is to work and if Americans want their government
to stop working for the collective appetite and to act from
moral intentions instead.

Chomsky sees that Americans are

avoiding these troublesome issues in favor of commodious
activity; and thus the hypocrisy and atrocities continue.
But to fit the character of modern life into his conspiracy
scheme, he offers that the elites, who control television,

give the people entertainment, such as professional
sports,39 so that they do not have the time to investigate
matters of international moral importance, and, thereby he
avoids acknowledging that Americans in their tacit
acceptance of the device paradigm share in complicity with
the governmental leaders in American foreign affairs.

But

even Chomsky, at his more thoughtful moments, recognizes
that it is finally the choice of Americans to tune in
sports rather than the debate on C-Span:
The gas station attendant who wants to use his
mind isn't going to waste his time on
international affairs . . . So he might as well
do it where it's fun and not threatening—
professional football or basketball or something
like that. But the skills are being used and the
understanding is there and the intelligence is
there [for informed decision making].40
This leads to Chomsky's fourth assumption:

that the

American people, if informed of American atrocities abroad,
would surely demand a change of the government and its
policies.

This is another difficult question.

The

American people do receive information about death squads
in El Salvador and Guatemala, and they have been informed
about the American government's support of the "democratic"
dictators there.
little.

Yet, Americans continue to do far too

This fact leads to the conclusion that Americans,

for the most part, will not necessarily act when evidence
is presented to them of atrocities.

Accordingly, the

American people must be held morally responsible along with

the leaders who institute foreign policy.

Of course, as

the above analysis shows, the issues outside the personal
economic and consumptive sphere tend to become fuzzy,
especially when the official line of the conservative
government interprets the atrocious events as regrettable
but understandable and when the people are disengaged from
the complex world in their passive leisure activities.
And, it is the distortion of the moral condition by the
government which leads people like Chomsky to urge the
conspiracy theory as a way to account for the dull response
of the populace.

But it remains, that in the age of

information, the American people can gather the documents
necessary to explore the questions themselves.

They are

not barred from libraries, nor are they banned from
receiving information from Oxfam, Amnesty International or
other world-monitoring or relief organizations.

And once

people make individual decisions, the Bill of Rights grants
them the political liberties needed to inform their
friends, relatives, and political representatives without
fear of reprisal.

It is still the case that unpopular

views could lead to one's firing, disenfranchisement, or,
in extreme cases, death, but these horrible results are
definitely not the normal repercussions for choosing to
take a political stand against American-sponsored
repression and terrorism abroad.

The person who works as

an insurance salesman in Tigard, Oregon will not be exiled

from the community for gathering facts and holding a
neighborhood meeting to discuss the Latin American
situation.

He or she is more likely to be seen as an

oddity, for this type of exercise of one's political
liberties simply does not occur with any frequency at all.
If people were to organize themselves in such a way or even
were they merely to wonder about their country's moral
commitment in the world, they would, without question, have
a marked effect on the government and its policies.
But, Americans do not exercise their political
liberties in ways similar to the one sketched above.
Rather, as the twofold character of modern life tells us,
people continue to live roughly half of their lives in
disengaged activities such as watching t.v.

Since

Americans affirm this way of life repeatedly, and since
they are implicated in the technological culture, by their
own consent, it can only be concluded that Americans, by
their unwillingness to act on the difficult international
questions, accept the course set by the current government,
and, therefore, they must be held as accomplices in the
moral atrocities committed by the American government and
its client states.

This is a harsh judgement.

But, in

consideration of the suffering of the people of the world
and the failure of affluent Americans to gather, apply and
distribute their personal and material resources in ways
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which are both possible and practical, this judgement
cannot be avoided.
Chomsky clearly understands that Americans have a
moral responsibility to the world that they are failing to
live up to.

He works passionately to wake Americans up

from their sleepy--consumer paradise with the plain and
horrible facts.

He knows that, if Americans wake up, they

can change the nation, as they did with the equal rights
and anti-war movements of the 1960's.

But, when Chomsky

charges that the elites are putting the people to sleep, he
is really crying out in despair over the truth that the
Americans, having heard the faint murmuring of injustice
and suffering, turned over in their beds and flipped off
the lights, thinking to themselves "I'll deal with it
tomorrow."

Tomorrow has not yet come.

The culture of

technology continues to provide the comfort necessary to
sleep in relative peace.
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A Hegelian Analysis of Malcolm Lowry*s Imperial Consul1
History shows that the Western nations, including the
United States, have engaged in imperialism.

Imperialism is

characterized by the use of military or economic force, by
the bringing of law to the "savages" and the wilderness,
and by the economic exploitation of the conquered people
and the land.

In all these instances domination by one

group of people over another group is the unambiguous
result.

I shall explore this phenomenon by considering

imperial domination in the light provided by Hegel’s
Master/Slave dialectic and by considering a specific
literary character who epitomizes many of the features of
the imperial Master consciousness in the hope of drawing a
practical moral lesson for ourselves.
***

Hegel gives his picture of the domination and
assertion of one group at the expense of others in his
Phenomenology.2

In the section on the Master and Slave,

Hegel argues that the Master seeks to assert himself at the
expense of others in a vain attempt to find freedom of his
self-consciousness by standing as lord over others.

But

paradoxically once the Master asserts himself over others,
he becomes dependent on the others/Slave.3
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In fact the

Master's freedom depends on the Slave for its very
existence, because without the Slave the Master cannot
actualize his self-consciousness as different from and
superior to the consciousness of others.4

This is

troublesome for the Master, because the more the Master
works to bend the Slave to his will, the more flimsy his
freedom becomes.

Taking this logic to its conclusion, we

find that were the Master to obliterate his others, to
achieve the most radical freedom of self (Hegel called this
pure negative freedom)5, he would discover his freedom to be
meaningless, for the dominance itself would be meaningless.
At a disturbing level this phenomenon is found in the
United States' dominance of Latin America.

The United

States holds Latin America in economic and political
slavery, and, in so doing, asserts its world dominance.6
Yet this dominance, true to the Hegelian analysis, remains
relative and precarious.

For as Paul Kennedy notes in his

recent book The Rise and Fall of Great Powers:

"Whether a

nation be today mighty and rich or not depends not on the
abundance or security of its power and riches, but
principly on whether its neighbors possess more or less of
it."7

And this dominance is precarious insofar as many of

the Latin American nations are at the brink of economic
calamity, threatening the loss of billions of dollars in
bad loans for the United States.

Here we see the

dependence of the Master on the Slave for his identity.
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For the Master becomes distinguished by the act of
asserting his relative superiority at the Slave’s expense.
And yet the Master becomes more frail in this relationship
because of the existing danger that the system of dominance
and submission will break apart with the collapse of the
slave.

Because of this danger the first world must

continually work to control the slave nations.8
Of course U.S. power will remain for many years to
come.

Latin America does not wield the military nor the

economic means to rival the leading power of the world.
Yet the U.S. asserts its superiority, often violently, over
Latin America.

And in doing so it becomes comic.

The

comic stance of the leading power is not a purposeful act
meant to amuse; rather the comicality of its dominance
stems from the fact that it believes itself to hold the
moral high ground in relation to Latin America, whereas, in
reality, it has not held it and does not hold it.

The U.S.

stands as comic in a contradiction of believing in its
moral superiority and acting contrary to it.
The contradiction of American belief and action (call
in m and ~m) leaves the comic nation with only an empty
idea of itself as the law bringing nation (e.g., John
Wayne) over the lawless "heathens" of the Third World.

To

bring this morally contradictory and, therefore, empty law,
the U.S. must pose a taxing structural apparatus, e.g., the
U.S. army in Panama, or the Contra army in Nicaragua, in

to ensure that the countries of Latin America remain
economically, militarily, and politically committed to the
programs of the United States, its government, and its
people.
The strategic ideas behind the Contra war demonstrate
this fact.

It is fairly well known that the Reagan

administration sought to weaken the Nicaraguan government'
ability to provide social and economic benefits to its
people by forcing it to fight a war and to withstand an
American trade embargo.

The policy succeeded in pushing

Nicaragua back into the direct sphere of American
influence.9

The American president claimed the moral high

ground when justifying his policy by reiterating the coldwar position that the U.S. was fighting Communism and its
exportation.

Yet, despite the legitimacy or illegitimacy

of this claim, the president did not attempt to argue for
or even to discuss the virtue of the overthrow of the
repressive Somoza regime nor did he attempt to argue for
the planned economic, social, and cultural reforms of the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

In this regard

American moral rhetoric was empty, for it was empty of
specific and enlightening content regarding the actual
situation in Nicaragua.

At the same time the U.S.

continued to arm, feed and organize the Contra army.
This activity cost Americans some money, but more
importantly it left the U.S. President in a ridiculous
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position, thanks to the Iran-Contra affair.

For after this

government fiasco became public, the picture of a nation
governed by the bumbling and disengaged Ronald Reagan
became extraordinarily clear.
The position of the U.S. as a nation with a
contradictory moral identity and as a comic nation lead by
a bumbling presidency falls in line with the Hegelian
analysis.

For as Hegel realized the "master has an

intuition of the supremacy of his single being-for self.
But although he certainly has this . . . it is a sublation
•

•

•

»

which occurs within others" and not himself.

10

It is the

U.S. that dominates, but the dominance is dependent.

It is

the U.S. that claims the moral high ground, but it is a
moral claim that is contradictory and hollow.

Furthermore,

Hegel showed that the Slave in the "privation and fear of
the Lord makes . . . the transition to universal selfconsciousness."11

Surely Nicaraguans did not gain full

freedom through their revolution, but they did demonstrate
the moral willingness and courage to work and fight for
moral, economic, and political self-determination.

And

despite their recent turn towards stoic acceptance of their
dependence on the U.S., with the recent election of the UNO
government, Nicaragua continues to demonstrate, as an
exemplar of Latin America, a moral strength that the U.S.,
despite its rhetoric, cannot match.

One need only look to

the statistics of low voter turn out and towards the
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vacuous and crudely seductive advertising that passes for
political debate in the U.S. to verify this assertion.
The tendencies of the Master/Slave relationship,
articulated by Hegel and found in the Third World's
relationship with the United States, can be found in
Malcolm Lowry's tragic character, Geoffry Firmin.12

In

fact, through a careful reading of Under the Volcano we
find in Firmin a character in the Hegelian mold of Master,
who, in his role as retired British Consul, comes to a
tragic demise.

His tragic flaw, in the classical sense,

lies with his inflated status as Consul of the British
Empire and his inability to encounter the world, except as
the towering but comic master.

The tragedy gains poignancy

in that he becomes aware of his position and disability,
but he is finally unable to change his course to stave off
his fate. Moreover, as a particular instance of the Master
consciousness, the Consul gives us insight into the
relationship of the Master and Slave which characterizes so
much of our own relationship with the Third World, and in
particular, Latin America.
***

The story of Under the Volcano centers on Geoffry
Firmin's reunion with both his wife Yvonne and his brother
Hugh on the celebatory "Day of the Dead."

Yvonne divorced

Firmin in the United States, after she fled him to pursue
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her acting career.

Hugh failed to discover a place for

himself in the Spanish Civil War, and he came back to his
brother some time before Yvonne's return.

The three of

them, after some preliminaries, head off for the festival
in Tlaxcala.

The novel reveals their thoughts, histories,

and interactions as the fateful day wears on.
The Consul has immediate difficulty adjusting to his
wife's unexpected return, and in the course of the day he
continues to search, find, and consume larger and larger
guantities of more and more potent alcohol.

Hugh and

Yvonne discuss the problem of the Consul's incessant
drinking and obliteration of their reunion.
to reach Firmin.
untouchable.

But they fail

He is cloaked in his alcohol and is

But they recognize that the Consul stands as

a representation of a larger folly, a larger obliterating
drunkenness that makes his condition understandable but all
the more impervious.
What's the good? Just sobering him up for a day
or two's not going to help. Good God, if our
civilization were to sober up for a couple of
days, it'd die of remorse on the third. 3
The Consul, ever strong, continues, and "the best
thing about [him] was his deceitful air of infallibility."14
He will not let remorse overtake him--neither for his lost
love nor for his lost opportunity at honest interaction.
Yvonne comes to Quauhnahuac, which the Consul,
incidentally but importantly, calls "home," to be with him

in a marriage.

But the Consul, when confronted by Yvonne’

hopefulness and forgiveness drinks Tequila and
felt his mind divide and rise, like two halves of
a counterpoised drawbridge, ticking, to permit
the passage of . . . noisome thoughts [of
Yvonne].
"Your heart darling?” she asked anxiously.
Nothing—
"Oh my poor sweetheart, you must be so weary."
"Momentito," [the Consul] said, disengaging
himself.15
And so it is, speaking in Spanish, the Consul disengages
himself from Yvonne.

And the hope of reunion is dashed by

his own lapse, his own disconnection.
The Consul is disengaged from the Mexicans as well.
He is unable to associate with them on anything but
official levels or from the standard imperial position of
pity.

When he does look at them in a non-Consul way they

become indistinguishable and unknowable.
As he looked it was as though these figures were
gathering silently together. Now they had become
one figure, one immense, malevolent creature
staring back at him.16
The Mexicans are a mass, unarticulated, and
frightening.
this mass.

Firmin dissolves the world around him into
But, as the Consul, he continues to stand,

precariously, with his stance secured by his position,
tequila, and the hallucinogenic mescal.

Yet as the

Hegelian analysis shows, once the Master gains such a high
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freedom at the expense of the Slave, he becomes more
dependent on the Slave.

And as the Master becomes more

dependent, his position becomes more comic.17
life becomes for Geoffry Firmin.

This is what

For in their own way,

Geoffry*s Mexican help makes a mockery of his power and
status.

When they come to work at his estate,

How gay were the Mexicans! The horticulturists
made the occasion as they made every possible
occasion,a sort of dance, bringing their
womenfolk with them . . . as though the whole
thing were a movement in a comic ballet,
afterwards lolling about in the shade . . . as if
the Consul himself did not exist.18
Thus, mockingly, the Mexicans move about their business,
knowing that though they depend on the Master for their
work, they are more engaged and freer than he supposedly
is.

Whereas the Master can not break from the negative

freedom provided by his comic dominance, the Slaves can
freely perceive the Master's dependence and artificiality.
From this knowledge they are gay and dancing, while the
Consul stumbles along, searching for his next drink— his
greatest source of differentiating power.
The text shows that the Consul is aware of his role of
Master and of his task of promoting his free consciousness
articulated in opposition to the Slave.

The Consul

realizes that his is a "battle for the survival of human
consciousness.1,19 Of course, this is his self-deception.
His is not human consciousness per se, but a particular
Master consciousness.
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There was not even a consistent basis to his
self-deceptions. How should there be then for
attempts at honesty? "Horror,” he said.
"Yet I
will not give in." But who was I, how find that
I, where had "I" gone? "Whatever I do, man is
unconquerable.1,20
The Consul will return to this refrain.

He will search for

"I" but he cannot find it apart from his huge will which is
backed, of course, by his status as retired Consul of the
British Empire.

Like the Hegelian Master-consciousness he

determines his consciousness in differentiation from the
other, not in conjunction with the Mexicans.

He does not

find his identity in the richness and difficulties of life
with his friends and with nature.

He finds the basis for

his life instead in his primitive strengths, both physical
and official, as he finds his bearings in the difficult
situation along the road to Tlaxcala by "the cars that both
bore upon their rear number-plates the sign 'Diplo
matic© 1."21
Yet, it must be remembered that the Consul quit his
diplomatic post.

In his conversation with M. Lauruelle, he

shows his realization of his and the imperium's
predicament.
He was pointing with his tennis racquet.
"The
slow darkening of the murals as you look from
right to left. It seems somehow to symbolize the
gradual imposition of the Spaniards' conquering
will upon the Indians . . ."22
The Consul removes his dark and forbidding glasses during
this conversation, revealing something of himself:

his
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face and his eyes.

He knows that they are the Masters, "a

kind of latter-day repercussion of the conquest."23

But

despite his knowledge the Consul cannot change his ways
fast enough.
honesty.

Yvonne awaits his love, his care, and his

But the day will not bring them together.

As the day passes and his world turns confusingly,
Firmin reaches out in prayer.

But, he prays by will alone.

He speaks to himself:
"Raise your head, Geoffry Firmin, breathe your
prayer of thankfulness, act before it is too
late." But the weight of a great hand seemed to
be pressing his head down.24
Whose hand is it?

Possibly it is God's or fate's.

But

more plausibly, it is the weight of the imperial culture
which gives Firmin the institutional apparatus to apply his
hardened will.

It gives laws and the ideology of power

mastery to him.

And it is its negative imperial power

which pushes his head down, just as the gravity of the life
of imperialism presses itself down on the Slave nation.
This gravity determines economic, military, and other
events beyond any one person.

How can a man, in one day,

overturn the "weight of such a heritage?"
While thinking of his life and of his brother,
Firmin's brother Hugh comes to a moment of realization that
proves especially appropriate for the Consul's condition:
[He] looked out of the window. Well after all
. . . the queer thing was, that love was real.
Christ, why can't we be simple, Christ Jesus, why
may we not all be brothers? 6
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Such a simple idea:

love.

implement with sheer exertion.

But an idea impossible to
Love requires care,

nurturing, and patient forgiveness.
lacking in the Consul's world.

These qualities are

The law can not encompass

them.27

They are too simple, too alien to the imperial

world.

The imperium stands above these qualities and opts

for economic efficiency through exploitation.

Love only

•exists in the dancing and gay slaves, for they realize the
folly of dependent mastery.
Near the climax of the novel, the Consul has separated
himself from Hugh and Yvonne.
where he orders mescal.

He wanders into a brothel

It is there that he experiences

his last haunting thoughts of Yvonne in the cacophony of
the Mexican mass other.
thought of Yvonne.

But, "deliberately he shut out all

He drank two swift mescals:

the voices

ceased.1,28
Alcohol delivers him.

He can no longer see straight

or even talk like the retired Consul that he is.

His

engagement with reality has turned into the fantasy of
being William Blackstone amongst the Indians.
fantasy reeks of the imperial.

But even his

He can not separate himself

from being the Consul to be who he is:

Geoffry Firmin, an

Englishman, standing in a wild Mexican brothel on a rainy
night— the night of the dead.

Instead he is William

Blackstone, William the Conqueror, or William Shakespeare—
it does not matter.

He is a self unable to relate to
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others, even as the Consul.

He is selfless, not because of

religious redemption, but because of his achievement of
pure negative freedom through the alcoholic obliteration of
the world.

The Slave, that the Master so depends upon,

exists no longer.
comes quickly.

Following (this obliteration, his end

He utters one last prayer:

"Please let me make her happy, deliver me from
this dreadful tyranny of self. I have sunk low;
let me sink lower still, that I may know the
truth. Teach me to love again, to love life."
But the prospects of becoming humble and actually
encountering29 his wife were too immediately demanding of
the servant of His Majesty.
"Let me be truly lonely, that I may honestly
pray. Let us be happy again somewhere, if it's
only together, if it's only out of this terrible
world. Destroy the World!."30
He returns to his imperialist and irrational refrain.
this time his prayer will be answered.
destroyed.

And

His world will be

He is shot, and he falls in lonely terror down

the ravine.
***

What does the Consul's demise say about us, a
civilization drunk on the disengaging reality of
consumptive goods provided by modern technology?

It surely

shows that in our drunkenness we have become both blind and
comic, a pathetic picture.

Our national interests are

secured abroad with little regard to human suffering.

And
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we are too dazed by MTV and the like to give enough thought
or care to the problem.

Our leaders stammer about calling

for the establishment of democracy and basic political
rights in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere, while many
in the world laugh at our posture, considering our past and
present abuses.
Knowing the condition, how should we make changes,
before we suffer our own tragic demise?31
find an answer with the Consul.

Perhaps we can

One available opportunity

to change for the Consul rested with his marriage.32

In a

good marriage the subjugation of the other is clearly a
false and doomed way of being united.

Surely, a marriage

goes through moments of dominance and submission.

But at

its best, it is a caring encounter between two committed
people.

Yvonne as we saw desired this (though in a

problematic form), yet the Consul, tragically, could not
respond.

For the Consul such an alternative was too

counter to the mentality of the Master for him to grasp,
especially while obliterating the frightful world with
alcohol.

For in the frightful chaos of his hallucinogenic

world, the only stability he could find was in the imposed
order of the imperium, an order which is false and, at
least in the moral sense, doomed.
Wendell Berry makes a sober claim for marriage in his
essay "People, Land, and Community."33
analogy between a marriage and farming.

In it, he draws an
In farming, as in

marriage, one enters the relationship with faith.

Faith is

necessary because one never knows what such a serious
decision will bring.

In both the case of farming and the

case of marriage, people act on their faith by bringing
good care and attention to the other (husband, wife, or
pasture).

Berry points out that this faith is not

something that covers days,

but years.

The yields from a

recovering hillside or a developing family may take ten,
twenty, or twenty-five years.

Still, people must keep

their faith and continue their works.

The marriage

relationship requires such commitment; otherwise, it would
dissolve, along with its promise and hope for today and for
the future.
Perhaps the model of marriage will not guide us on
every front.

But it stands as an alternative.

And,

insofar as belief in the tragic view (i.e., the belief that
the tragic fate is the fate of all men; ergo, there is
nothing we can do to change our fate), cannot be a
practical concern, in that such a belief only leads to
resignation and cynicism, we should try to correct the
flaw, which the Consul had so deeply imbedded in himself,
in ourselves.

At the very least, the marriage model would

be superior to the "our backyard"34 syndrome, where Latin
America is relegated to the sandbox of imperial culture.
To look at Latin America and its particular countries as
participants in a union of equals would be far more

productive, for it would allow both parties to move to
higher stages of development, instead of allowing only the
slave to move on.35

The marriage model would also demand

that the imperial culture relinquish its control and set
aside its law in order to integrate and exchange with the
culturally different.

The exchange, of course, should not

only be in consumer goods, but of heritage and
understanding, gradually shared and gained through a union
of interests and aspirations, undergirded with respect for
and cultivation of difference.
Such a change will require that the people of the
United States recognize themselves as members in the world
community whose real worth depends not on the degree of
control which they exercise abroad, but in their caring,
non-violent, and devoted presence and energy which they
bring to the world, through their institutions and
governing bodies.

If the U.S. were to act in such a way,

the response of the world would be positive.

And perhaps,

eventually, respect for the United States would replace the
current stoic acceptance of Western hegemony that is now
common amongst the people of the world.

And, furthermore,

if the United States were to apply its power while in a
position of respect, due to its genuinely positive moral
contributions to the world, it would be understood within
the context of a positive familial relationship.

So long

as the act was not arbitrarily violent or oppressive and so
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long as the world could perceive the rationale supporting
the use of power, the U.S.'s assertion of power could be
meaningful and positive.

This possibility does not mean

that the U.S. should ever stop listening to the concerns,
complaints, and hopes of people of different cultures; if
the U.S. did decide not to listen to the people of the
world, then the use of arbitrary power would no longer be
only in the background, rather it would become a threat to
the people of the world once again.
Of course, a positive condition such as this requires
a fundamental and difficult adjustment on the part of the
people of the United States.
in this regard with Yvonne.

Obviously, the Consul fails
For he cannot redefine

himself, apart from his imperial position or fantasy.

He

obliterates the world, and, sadly, so do we in many ways.
But hope for our situation can be found where the Consul
fails in his relationship with Yvonne.

For if we apply

principles found in the basic and successful marriage to
the presently abusive relationships of which we are a
dominant part, perhaps we could move into the light, out
from the loveless and lonely darkness which marks so much
of Geoffry Firmin's world in Under the Volcano.
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The Question of Free Expression
at the Privately Owned Shopping Mall1
This essay is broadly about the conflict between the
liberties of free expression and property ownership.
Specifically, it is concerned with this conflict in
relation to the shopping mall.

Over the past thirty years

the shopping mall has become an undeniable center of public
commercial activity, and, as such, the mall has been an
attractive place for those wishing to express political
ideas.

However, these quasi public places remain, for the

most part, privately owned.

And, the mall owners have

sought to exclude political activities in order to foster a
pleasant commercial atmosphere at their malls.

In this

conflict between the rights of free expression and private
ownership many cases have found their way to the courts in
search of resolution.

One non-theoretical task for this

essay is to trace this conflict as it has been framed,
resolved, and revised by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to
demonstrate the practical way in which this issue is
handled by the political institution entrusted with
protecting liberties.
But what is of interest to philosophers lies behind
the case law surrounding this issue.

Philosophical

questions (such as "In a conflict of liberties, which
50
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liberty should carry the most weight?” and "Where should
the court look for answers when precedent conflicts or is
non-existent?") have demanded principled answers that could
provide a stable foundation for the resolution of any
future conflict over this issue.
These philosophical questions have been raised and
answered by Ronald Dworkin.

And the first part of this

essay is largely concerned with restating his jurisprudence
so that it is readily applicable to the case law which
follows in the second part.
Criticisms of Dworkin's proposals in general have been
many and varied.

This essay will not, however, attempt to

reconcile Dworkin with his critics, nor will it attempt to
argue thoroughly for his fundamental position.

Instead

this essay will be an application of Dworkin's legal theory
to the specific Constitutional problem which the series of
cases discussed herein represent.

To serve this end, the

writings of Dworkin's critics will be used only to
distinguish his critical suggestions.
The third part of the essay will consider which course
the court ought to have taken at the crucial moment in the
development of the case law.

It will become clear that the

Court changed its position on this issue in a very
fundamental way without, at the same time, addressing the
basic and difficult issue of how these liberties should be
balanced when they are in conflict.

To accomplish this
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end, this essay will rely again on Dworkin's jurisprudence
and, in particular, on his notion of justification in the
process of adjudication.
I
Ronald Dworkin's analysis is familiar to many, for his
arguments have appeared in books, journals, and in such
periodicals as the New York Review of Books.

Aside from

his clear analysis and prose, his greatest contribution to
legal theory is the notion of the place that principles
hold in the rule of law.

For Dworkin and his followers,

laws are not crafted by judges who have ranging discretion,
when the rules of the case law precedent fail to extend to
the case at hand.2

Rather, judges, who act responsibly,

draw upon principles as well as rules when making their
decisions.

These principles are not invented by judges;

they are principles which the larger political community
accepts and which can be readily extracted from the extant
legal materials.3
Much of the criticism surrounding Dworkin's position
comes from those who believe that there exist no stable
principles for the guidance of legal decision making,
whether inside or outside the law, and that all principles
that exist must be fought over in the various legal arenas,
including the courts, by the many interest groups which
constitute contemporary society.

Thus, these critics hold,4

law cannot be separated from politics, and there exists no
such binding principles to guide the decisions of judges.
We will take this position into greater account in the
third part, but for now let it be sufficient to note that,
according to Dworkin, these critics miss the decisive fact
that people before the courts have the right to expect that
the decisions affecting their lives be made in accord with
past political decisions reached by various political
bodies in publicly authorized ways.

Principles serve to

bind past political decisions to contemporary legal
decisions in such a way that were a judge to act
arbitrarily, he or she would be acting irresponsibly.5
Without such responsibility there could be no political and
cultural integrity.6

For people expect to be governed under

the expressed principles of the political community.

These

expectations make it very difficult for a judge or law
maker to act without regard to the past or to principles.7
Furthermore, the principles themselves will serve to
focus the debate surrounding an issue and to guide the
decision making process towards a generally acceptable end.
Take, for example a city council person in Missoula,
Montana.

He or she would find it very difficult to

implement a law banning the right of people to express
their opinions on the editorial pages of the Missoulian
newspaper, because such an act would be contrary to the
principles of freedom of press and speech.

Likewise were
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the council person to attempt to limit the right of farmers
in the valley to own horses, he or she would undoubtedly
fail because of the Constitutional right of property owners
to do what they see fit with their property.

In both of

these cases the courts would require a compelling state
interest to support these political proposals, for to
sustain them would be to breach the integrity of law which
our community understands itself to live under.
These two examples serve to illustrate that people
come to recognize the rule of law in its principled
features in addition to the specific rules which regulate
the life of the community.

And by abiding by the larger

principles, even if this means challenging some particular
rule or narrow principle, say by civil disobedience, the
public reaffirms the importance that principles hold in the
life of the community.
The fact that judges hold positions of political
responsibility requires them to make decisions that
maintain the integrity of the community, just as do the
city council representatives.8

The judges must adhere to

and reapply principles as they come to decide cases in law
where the factual precedent fails to settle the case before
the court.

Dworkin calls such cases "hard cases."

For the

judge must weigh the rights of the parties in terms of the
principles which support their positions and come to a
difficult or "hard" decision.9
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Principles do not arise from nowhere, and judges are
not expected to invent them.

Principles have arisen and

developed throughout the history of the political
community, and judges play a role in their articulation as
well as interpretation.
The principles of free expression and private property
ownership are two liberal political principles that arose
in modern form with the Enlightenment and its philosophical
emphasis on the individual.

They became established in law

in England and the United States through particular
political acts of citizens, legislators, and courts.10

In

the U.S. the early American Congress established the
principles of expression and property ownership in the bill
of rights of the Constitution.

With these rights written

into the Constitution, and also established elsewhere, the
rights became part of the institutional morality of law;
from this position their effect on the debate and
interpretation of legal questions and precedent become
firmly and undeniably established.
In the process of moving from what were initially only
liberal philosophical ideas to fixed and institutionalized
principles at work in law, the key element has been the
interpretation of prior law in terms of principles.
interpretation follows a certain methodology.

This

Yet,

according to Dworkin, most judges rely on their experience
and knowledge to approximate the following methodology
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without making its features fully explicit.11

Nonetheless,

judges do employ the conceptual aspects of Dworkin's model
when deciding difficult cases.12
Methodology
The judge, when deciding a difficult case, acts like
an author in a chain novel, according to Dworkin.13

An

author in a chain novel must fit his or her particular
possible turn of the plot on the preceding chapters of the
book.

An author cannot simply break the continuity of a

character capriciously.

He or she must read carefully the

prior work for its expressed continuity and meaning; then
he or she must continue the development of the novel in way
that is consistent with the story's development and which
enhances the philosophical or moral substratum of the work
in progress.

To perform such work requires an analytic

knowledge of the characters and their relationships as well
as an interpretive understanding of the moral world-view
which emerges from the story and the interactions of the
characters.
If an author were continuing the novel Brave New
World, it would be difficult for him or her to write the
final section with the Savage living out his life in
cynical retirement on the Falkland Islands as proposed by
the Controller.

For although this continuation could

surely be made to fit the story, it would fail to give the
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character of the Savage the dimensions of care, love and
intensity for human life, which contrasted so sharply with
the soma-consuming public and the cynical genius Mustafa
Mond.

In short the novel would become a cynical story

about human nature, instead of a moral indictment of people
handing over their humanity in return for the consumer
comforts of the Brave New World.
In much the same way a judge must carefully interpret
the case before him or her for fit within the context of
law and for its moral world-view in order to make a
decision.

To do this the judge must initially consider the

various possible outcomes of the case based on the
competing claims made by the parties involved.

The judge

must also consider the possible outcomes in relation to the
relative precedent and to the principles found in the case
law.

The judge must look to the closely related cases in

order to see which outcome fits the principles that emerge
from the precedent (or which support the precedent).

Once

the judge makes these first judgments about the competing
claims, he or she may have a number of possible outcomes
which roughly fit the related precedent.

At this point the

judge must expand his consideration outwardly to see how
the possible outcomes measure up with the political
morality expressed in other, closely related fields of
law.14

From such an effort the judge will begin to see the
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relative place of the competing claims within the larger
general area of law.
It may be that in certain difficult cases where
precedent is uncertain and the principles suggest several
alternative solutions that the best decision may be a socalled "brilliant account."

A brilliant account brings to

the surface some supposed principle which may not have been
articulated prior to the case at hand.

Justice Douglas

gave such a brilliant account in Griswold v. Connecticut.15
In this famous case Justice Douglas identified the right of
privacy in the penumbras of the first, third, forth, and
fifth amendments to the Constitution.

Before this Supreme

Court decision, the right of privacy did not exist
explicitly in the body of Constitutional law.

It was not

until Justice Douglas made his brilliant "discovery" that
the people of the United States obtained explicit
Constitutional protection of privacy.16
Once the judge has expanded his or her consideration
to include other fields of law and once the judge has
sought justification of the possible outcomes based on the
morality which emerges from the extant legal materials, the
judge must give the competing claims another test.

For it

may be that the institutional morality provides several
different but plausible solutions which are incommensurable
and yet justifiable.

The judge must ask:

"Which

interpretation shows the community as a whole in the best

light?"

This is the most difficult test, for at this point

the judge must turn the interpretation toward the community
to determine whether the decision that the judge is
considering is worthy of the political, historical, and
moral tradition which the political community believes
itself to be striving for and, to a certain degree,
achieving.

It is as if the novelist, having ruled out a

number of possible interpretations and plot lines for a
character based on the character's place in the story, must
now decide which of the two remaining plots to choose.

He

or she knows that this line must bring the story towards
its fruition and conclusion, while, at the same time,
fostering and enhancing the moral significance of the story
on the whole.

The judge in his or her turn must ask "Does

this decision show the United States to be a nation of
greed or charity? A nation of freedom or tyranny? A nation
of moderation or intemperance?" and so on.

Questions such

as these enlarge the scope of the final consideration to
include both the history and the political ideals of the
nation.17
According to this analysis a judge could make a
mistake in deciding a case in two ways:

1) he or she could

make a mistake of fit by neglecting some important argument
of principle found in the legal morality, and 2) he or she
could make a mistake of justification by neglecting to
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address the deep and important moral issue which the case
at hand manifests.18
With the review of Dworkin's jurisprudence completed,
we can turn now to the case law relating to the exercise of
free speech in the shopping malls.
II
The development of the case law in this area began
with Marsh v . Alabama. which was heard in 1945.19

It

involved a Jehovah's Witness woman who distributed
religious tracts in the downtown area of Chicksaw, Alabama.
The Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned Chicksaw and it
forbade such activities on its property.

Thus, her

activity attracted the Mobile County Sheriff, who was
employed by the company.

She was ordered off the street.

She refused and was arrested on trespassing charges.

She

later contended, in the Alabama Court of Appeals, that her
rights to freedom of expression and free expression of
religion under the first amendment had been violated.

The

Alabama court rejected her claim and let stand the
trespassing conviction.

She appealed to the U.S. Supreme

Court.
The Supreme Court faced a difficult question insofar
as the rights of property owners to exclude people from
their property and the right of freedom of speech and
religion were in conflict.

It was clear to the Court that
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were Chicksaw publicly owned, the question would have been
easily decided in favor of the petitioner, based on .
precedent.

But since the town was privately held, the

question became foremost a matter of principle.
The Court began its reasoning process by noting that
the downtown area of Chicksaw was connected to government
>

services, namely the post office, the state highway, and
the county sheriff.

The Court continued by noting that the

people of Chicksaw used the place as they would any
downtown area, and that if Chicksaw were not privately
owned, the first amendment rights of the petitioner to pass
*

•

•

peacefully religious literature would have been protected.

?0

The Court then framed its decision around the question "Can
residents be denied their rights to freedom of religion and
expression because Chicksaw is privately owned?"

The court

answered negatively.
In its response to this question the Court followed
principles which were found in the prior case law.
principles served as premises for its decision.

These

The first

principle enunciated was that ownership does not mean
absolute dominion.21

The Court then stipulated the specific

idea that "the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up
his property for use by the public in general, the more do
his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it."22

The court

stated further that since the facilities were built for the
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public, i.e. it served a public function, the facilities
were subject to regulation.
By establishing the fact that property owners could be
obligated by law to allow activities that they would
initially disallow on their property, the court turned to
one practical point and one philosophical principle to
bolster its argument.

The practical point held that no

matter who owned the town, the community had an interest in
keeping the channels of communication free.

For to act as

good citizens, people must be informed, and to be informed,
exchange of ideas must be uncensored.23

The philosophical

principle held that
[wjhen we balance the constitutional rights of
owners of property against those of the people to
enjoy freedom of press and religion . . . we must
. . . remain mindful of the fact that the latter
occupy a preferred position.24
This is an undeniable judgment on the high value of
speech relative to the constitutional rights of property
ownership.

The Court in weighing these rights considered

both the Constitutional law and the larger political
morality.25
The dissent presented a "flood gate" argument, holding
that the principle of the Marsh decision would allow people
to remain on private property against the will of the
owner.

To dam the flood, the dissent offered that in the

future the principles of Marsh should be limited to the
facts of the case only.

The dissent further argued that
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the appellant could have carried out her activity somewhere
else and that the state did not have the moral duty to
provide "opportunity of information."26

Although the

dissent did not say this explicitly, it was clearly their
intention to limit the future force of the principle of
Marsh.
The principle of Marsh was extended to the shopping
mall by the Supreme Court in Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 et al. v. Logan Valiev Plaza Inc. et a l .27
This case focused on whether the food workers' union could
picket at a privately owned shopping center complex.

The

Court framed the question in such a way that the opinion
centered on the issue of competing Constitutional rights.
For as Justice Marshall's opening sentence stated:
This case presents the question whether peaceful
picketing of a business enterprise located within
a shopping center can be enjoined on the ground
that it constitutes an unconsented invasion of
28
property rights.
•

The Court's argument proceeded as follows.

First the

Court asserted that speech in a place generally open to the
public is protected, absent other limiting factors.

These

other factors include time, place, and manner restrictions
which could be imposed to regulate activity of the
expression itself.

Secondly, the court held that if the

Logan mall had been a sidewalk of a municipality, speech
would have been protected due to the historical use of town
centers as a place for discussion and debate of political

issues.29

Thirdly the Court noted that the fact that speech

can be regulated (i.e. for time, place, and manner) does
not necessitate that speech must be barred.

Fourthly, the

Court, relying on Marsh, held that despite the fact that a
place is privately owned, the place may still be treated as
though it were public for certain purposes.

And fifthly,

the Court established that the mall was "clearly the
functional equivalent" of a central business district of a
municipality.30

From these premises the Court concluded

that it could not find any reasonable ground to deny the
first amendment rights of the petitioners, thereby
overturning the lower court's injunction.
Clearly the logical necessity of this argument depends
on the choice of equating the mall with the central
shopping district.

In order to establish this claim fully

the Court added to its argument the historical fact that
the malls had taken on the role of the central shopping
district when the people of America migrated from the
country and the cities to the suburbs.
A final interesting point was made by Justice Douglas
in his concurring statement.

He noted that there was

something essentially unfair in considering the mall "a
sanctuary from which some members of the public may be
excluded merely because of the ideas they espouse."31
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner32 the Court changed its
position considerably.

This case centered on the question
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of whether a group of protestors had the right to pass out
leaflets opposing the war on Vietnam in the privately owned
Lloyd Center mall.

The District Court and the Court of

Appeals held that the protestors' first Amendment rights
were protected following the precedent of Marsh and Logan,
but the Supreme Court overturned their decisions and broke
with the principles of Marsh and Logan in the process.
In its long opinion the Supreme Court did not argue as
methodically as did it did in the Logan decision.

Rather,

it attempted to recharacterize the mall as primarily a
private place designed with commercial purposes in mind.
To serve this recharacterization the Court emphasized the
utilitarian and aesthetic aspects of the mall from the
commercial and consumptive points of view.

This emphasis

was, and is, clearly at odds with the political and
cultural vision of the mall-as-town-center which the Court
used in Logan.

Yet, in order to overturn Logan, the Court

acknowledged that it had to address the equivalence of the
mall to the towncenter.

But first the Court determined

that the scope of Logan was limited.

The Court based this

position on the footnote number 9 in Logan which reserved
the possibility that future decisions could bar "picketing
which was not . . . directly related in its purpose to the
use to which the shopping center property was being put."33
From this language written into the Logan decision the
Court could avoid applying the principle of Logan directly
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to Lloyd.

And thus the court was given an opening from

which to address and question the position that malls are
essentially equivalent to central business districts.
The Court, however, did not directly address the
principle of Logan.

Instead the Court traced the principle

to Marsh and found that the Marsh decision stood on
peculiar facts relating to a company-owned municipality
only.

The Court then claimed that the Marsh decision was

an anomaly of the past; and, thus, the principle of Marsh
could be dismissed as largely irrelevant to the new
historical development of the privately owned shopping
mall.

The development of the notion of "functional

equivalent" found in Logan was dismissed by the Court, as
well, because of the possibility, left open in Logan. of
limiting the principle to speech related to the mall34 and
because the Court believed the business district language
in Logan to be "unnecessary."35
To bolster its position, as it did in Logan. the Court
made a number of points.

First it reiterated that the

handbilling had no relation to the mall and that the
respondents could have acted politically elsewhere.
Secondly, it argued that the respondents misinterpreted the
scope of the invitation given to the public by the Lloyd
corporation.36

Thirdly, the utilitarian end of the mall as

a place designed foremost for commercial transactions was
asserted.

Fourthly, the Court noted that the difference
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between a small store and a large mall was only a
difference of degree, not of principle, implying that were
the principle of Logan to be extended, small business could
be required to allow speech on their premises.
Near the end of the opinion, the Court addressed the
deep question of whether expression or private ownership
ought to prevail.

The Court acknowledged the special place

of the first amendment in Constitutional law.

But the

Court added that it never granted the right to free
expression on private property,37 and that property does not
lose its private character simply because the public is
invited on it.

Thus, the Court ruled in favor of the fifth

amendment over the first, largely because it reasoned that
the first amendment was not applicable to the facts.
In Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board et al.
the Court addressed the question of whether or not union
members had the right to picket their employer, the Butler
Shoe Company, in the North DeKalb Shopping Center in
suburban Atlanta.

This case would at first glance appear

to fall within the guidelines of note number 9 in Logan,
but the court argued that, in fact, Llovd completely
overruled Logan and set a new precedent in the process.
The Court first argued that the Constitutional right
of free speech is only good against the government.

Thus,

the decision in Marsh was not only an anomaly in fact, but
in principle as well.

The Court acknowledged that Lloyd
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left parts of Logan intact, including the notion that
speech could be allowed in the privately owned malls.

But

the Court claimed that this position was contradictory and,
in fact, the Llovd decision was a defacto rejection of
XQ

Loaan.

To make this claim the Court once again relied on the
note number 9 to Logan.

In this case the Court claimed

that when the Logan Court offered the possibility that the
content of speech in the malls could be regulated to
include only speech relevant to the mall itself, that the
Logan Court had erred, because speech, as protected by the
first amendment, cannot be lawfully regulated for content
alone.

And thus, since Logan left this question open as a

condition in its decision and since Llovd did not allow
speech ostensibly unrelated to the mall, the Hudgens Court
concluded that free speech could not be allowed at the
shopping malls at all, for to do so would be to regulate
the content of free expression.
Ill
The case law shows clearly that in Marsh the Court
articulated the right to freedom of religion and press at a
privately owned town and that in Logan the Court extended
this basic principle to cover speech in shopping malls.
fact, the Court in Logan developed a certain test for
whether speech ought to be allowed in a privately owned

In
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mall (i.e. the "sufficiently public" criterion).

But in

Lloyd and Hudgens the Court managed somehow to unseat the
principle of free expression in shopping malls.

And in its

place the court asserted the contrary principle that since
the malls are intended for commercial use, the owners of
malls could regulate the content, as well as the time,
place, and manner, of any expression on their property.
To perform this overthrow the court relied extensively
on footnote number 9 to the Logan decision.

Thus, this

section of analysis and criticism will begin by considering
the type of reasoning surrounding note number 9 and the
implications of this form of reasoning for jurisprudence.
The essay will then proceed to apply Dworkin's response to
this form of reasoning and its implications, in relation to
the case law discussed herein, so that a final reassessment
and criticism of the Court's actions can be made.
When the Hudgens Court made its decision on note
number 9 that the Llovd ruling was a defacto rejection of
the principles of Logan and Marsh. it argued that because
speech could not be regulated for content and because note
number 9 regulated for content (a contradiction) and,
moreover, since Llovd disallows most all content, that no
speech for any purpose could be exercised freely in
shopping malls.

The Court, however, consciously or

unconsciously missed a subtlety in its reasoning process.
That is, if the argument of Hudgens is correct, and courts
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cannot rule on the content of speech, then the Court could
very well look on footnote number
the note was held as

9 as an error itself. If

an error, it appears the Court could

have disregarded it and moved on to further apply the
principles of the earlier decisions, for the Llovd court
would have lacked an

opening from which to restrict the

content of speech in

the shopping malls.

Thus, it is clear that the Hudgens Court had two
possible logical outcomes from which to choose when forming
its opinion.

The first, which it chose, overruled the

rights found in Marsh and Logan and asserted the fifth
amendment rights of property owners.

The second, which it

perhaps negligently omitted, would have allowed the first
amendment principles to stand.

This is a tricky legal and

logical point, but when we bring the logic to the surface,
we see that just below the reasoning lies the principles of
free expression and property ownership.

These principles

could not be considered directly by the Hudgens Court, for
they were already weighed relative to each other in Logan
(with free expression rights found to be the heavier of the
two).

Thus the Court masked its deep choice with a logical

point, ironically neglecting the demands of logic and
avoiding the central issue in the process.
Such an obvious breach of principle in the case law
seems to support the position of Dworkin's critics who
claim that there is no guarantee that principles will
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remain stable in law in the face of attacks from clever
partisans.
Dworkin's Response
Based on the analysis of the first section, three
basic responses can be safely assumed in answer to the
questions which the case law presents.

The first response

would be that the Supreme Court simply acted in an
unprincipled manner by breaking the "story line" of Marsh
and Logan with the legal sophistry of Llovd and Hudgens.
The second response would be that there are principles
present in the law which are equally weighty and possibly
contradictory from which the Court could and can choose
from in reaching its decisions.

The third response would

be that although it appears that the first and fifth
amendments are irreconcilable in this case, there does
exist a deep political theory which can resolve the
complicated conflict.
The first response asserts that a mistake was made by
the Court in Llovd and Hudgens. if the idea of principled
interpretation of legal precedent is to be taken seriously.
For it is quite clear that the Lloyd and Hudgens decisions
break the continuity of the case law which began with Mash
and Logan.

The justices were aware of the breach; but, the

majority of justices were able to find legal materials to
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support a wholly different decision.

This fact leads to

Dworkin's second and, eventually, third responses.
Dworkin second response can be found in his
realization that at times Justices will cause a principle
to fall into disuse by weakening its scope and force.40
This appears to be the case with the Llovd decision.41

For

with the Lloyd decision the Court managed to recharacterize
the mall as a place for commercial purposes and to limit
the scope of the principle of Marsh and Logan.

This

understanding on the part of Dworkin would appear again to
support the position of Dworkin's critics.

For here

Dworkin would be acknowledging that the institutional
morality of law alone is insufficient to guarantee a
continuous and principled narrative of law.

But as the

earlier recollection of Dworkin's jurisprudence shows,
Dworkin does accept the fact that the law, without recourse
to the political morality of the community, will bring
contradictory rulings.

Dworkin does show that the judge

can clarify the legal materials by asking questions such as
"Which decision is supported by the bulk of legal
material?"42

But questions such as this are not meant to be

definitive, only helpful.

The deepest test is to be found

in the judge's appeal to the community's larger political
morality.
Yet many critics of Dworkin, such as Andrew Altman,
hold that the very idea of judges looking to some

definitive external political morality and finding a
fundamental answer is little more than empty idealism.43
Altman points to Alasdair MacIntyre's position that modern
industrial society suffers from incommensurable moral world
views which make political and cultural disagreement
interminable.44

The implications of this criticism for

Dworkin's jurisprudence are obvious:

if the moral world

views found in society are incapable of settling deep
disagreements, then any morality chosen by a judge to
justify his or her decision can only be accomplished at the
expense of another, competing moral world view.

And if the

judge chooses one political morality over another to
justify his or her decision, he or she is only doing so
from his or her personal bias.

Further, if any legal

decisions are settled by the judge's personal bias, the
place of objectivity and fairness in the legal realm is
greatly reduced, and the legal world becomes merely a
battleground for competing interests.
Dworkin turns away from such a ''disquieting"
perspective.45

He turns instead to John Rawls, whose

philosophy generally encompasses competing interests in
society.46

It is Rawls' theory which forms the substantive

part of Dworkin's third response.
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Rawls
In his essay "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,"
John Rawls argues that following the post-Reformation Wars
of Religion the primary and guiding political doctrine has
been the principle of toleration.47

The principle of

toleration allows for a "diversity of general and
comprehensive doctrines, and for the plurality of
conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the
meaning, value, and purpose of human life . . . affirmed by
the citizens of democratic societies.1,48 This encompassing
moral view lends itself to a "long-run equilibrium" of
social unity over the generations in which people come to
accept the basic idea of political differences.49

These

differences, displayed and debated in public, will be
deepened and modified by a process of debate over the
generations.50
If this conception is accurate, then the struggle of
the incommensurable moral views can be understood as a
vital competition in which the competitors still share a
central agreement on the long-run common good.

What

remains at the most basic level of political culture and
philosophy is the belief that tolerance is necessary to
preserve this healthy competition of interests.51

But can

the idea of tolerance be used by judges to answer difficult
legal questions such as the one discussed herein?

Tolerance can be seen as an intuitive first step
towards solving the problem of conflicting liberties.

And

if we look to Rawls' A Theory of Justice we can find there
a prescription for solving the deep legal issue at stake in
the case law.52

From the imaginary original position we

learn that rational people, when unaware of their fates
once they enter society, will adopt the most just system of
liberties and fair system of institutions and distribution
of goods that they can.

Since each person is unaware of

whether or not he or she will be in the minority or
majority, politically powerful or weak, and so on, each
individual would seek the greatest available liberty.

From

this idea Rawls postulates the first principle of justice:
"Each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty
for others."53

But Rawls recognizes that unrestricted

liberties will naturally collide, and that, as a result,
they must be restricted to avoid conflict.54

This

restriction must be guided by the rational directive of the
first principle of justice; thus, each liberty can be only
limited "for the sake of liberty itself."55
Rawls asserts that the most fundamental of liberties
is freedom of conscience, for the participants in th,e
original position would need this principle in order to
protect their rights to think for themselves, to speak
their minds, and to live their own lives, apart from any

76

oppressive religious or political dogma.

In short, freedom

of conscience is necessary to secure tolerance, both for
oneself and for others.

The principle of utility, however,

would be rejected by the participants of the original
position because "their freedom would be subject to . . .
social interests . . .1,56 And for a rational person to
subject himself or herself aoriori to the possibility of
political or religious persecution or silence would be
irrational and, therefore, unacceptable.
Reassessment
It is evident that the Supreme Court ought to have
brought the central question of conflicting Constitutional
rights clearly into its decision in Llovd and Hudgens.
in neither decision did the Court do so.

But

Instead the Court

opted to consider and reconsider certain facts in such a
way that the Court could bend its decisions to its changing
vision of free expression in shopping malls.

By acting

this way the Court breached the "story line" which began
with Marsh and Logan.

But as was discussed, the courts can

find conflicting evidence to support contradictory
decisions in the case law itself; thus, the Court's action
in Llovd and Hudgens seems to be in keeping with the
possibilities allowed in law (although the spirit of the
Court's earlier decisions was surely violated).

Still,

Dworkin shows that the Court, in its interpretive position,

77

ought to have considered the central question of
conflicting liberties openly and in relation to the
external political morality, instead of relegating this
important question to the space of a footnote.
The external political morality, if considered in
terms of tolerance and the first principle of justice,
would surely give more emphasis to the practice of free
expression than to the rights of property owners to exclude
speech activities from their malls due to the priority of
liberty of conscience.

Yet, here Rawls' principle of

tolerance would have to handle the question of future
factual limitations of free expression in relation to the
legitimate right of property ownership while also answering
the interpretive question of how much influence the
argument from utility should carry.

Rawls' answer to the

first of these problems is found in his statement that
liberties of conscience can be only limited by "arguments
[which] establish a reasonably certain interference with
the essentials of public order."57

Certainly free

expression in the shopping mall need not interfere with the
essentials of public order.

For people have used the town

center as a place for both speech and commerce for fifty
years under the protection of liberty without being
construed as threatening the essential public order.

To

insure this the law could direct that speech in shopping
malls be in keeping with the general atmosphere of the

place in the manner, time, and place of the activity.

But

the content of the speech should not be a concern of the
courts.

Such an opening for speech in the mall could allow

handbilling and information tables regulated by the
management to keep the commercial aspect of the mall vital.
All people, with their manifold points of view, should be
allowed access to the mall for such purposes.

Yet, the

property owners will argue that this activity will take
away from the mall as a pleasant place to shop and from its
sanctuary features, and, thus, people will no longer be
attracted to its shops.

From Rawls' theory one could argue

that the utilitarian argument that the mall is
fundamentally a place for commerce is unfair to those who
need to communicate their ideas in a public setting.

For

the mall stands as a central gathering place for people of
the community.

Very few places in most communities attract

a cross-section of the population throughout the day as the
shopping mall does.

And since the mall replaced the

traditional gathering place, people ought to be able to
exercise their most basic right of conscience in the
privately owned shopping mall.

If they are not allowed,

they are being unfairly deprived of their liberty because a
relatively few people replaced everyone's field for the
exercise of free speech with an exclusive and privately
owned place.

Final Verdict
Since the Supreme Court failed to consider the
question of principle openly and because the Court
neglected the larger political morality of the community,
the Court's decision in Llovd and Hudgens must be
considered a mistake according to Dworkin's analysis.
Furthermore, since the decision must be considered a
mistake, the Court ought to take a hard look at any future
cases which are related to this area of law and reverse the
Llovd/Hudgens error.
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